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Rethinking Creative Genius 
 
Michael Pickering and Keith Negus 
 
We pick up a newspaper in September 2003, and read a review of 
Christopher Ricks’s book on Bob Dylan (Ricks, 2003).  The reviewer is 
Andrew Motion, the English poet laureate.  As he gets into the stride of 
his discussion of the book, he makes the only slightly hesitant assertion: 
‘These days no one would think – would they? – that it’s doubtfully 
transgressive or suspiciously cool to call Dylan a genius’ (Motion, 2003: 
10).   
 
This is an interesting statement for several reasons.  For a start, it 
acknowledges from a present standpoint that it was once doubtful to 
claim that as a poet or songwriter Dylan possesses the qualities of 
greatness conventionally extolled in highbrow aesthetics. Motion 
suggests that previously anyone who had proclaimed Dylan’s genius 
would have been regarded with suspicion.  They would have been 
considered as affecting a pose (being provocative or pretentious rather 
than conventionally straight about questions of artistic greatness).  This is 
no longer the case. In referring to past controversies, Motion now accepts 
that a significant change of judgement has occurred, though he does 
remain rather cautious in his recognition of this. The question that is 
sandwiched in the middle of Motion’s aesthetically loaded sentence could 
be taken as either rhetorical or expressive of genuine uncertainty that the 
days of doubt are past – perhaps we are still in a transitional phase.  But 
Motion goes on in his review to dispel any further doubt.  He writes that 
what is exciting about Ricks’s book is its air of vindication, for in the past 
Ricks has, in the face of both highbrow antagonism and disbelief, long 
championed Dylan as an artist of genius – albeit one he recognises mainly 
through his lyrics rather than these in combination with the expressive 
flights of Dylan’s idiosyncratic, word-transforming vocal ability, and his 
continual risk-taking in reinventing his songs in their musical and vocal 
delivery. 
 
We need hardly labour the irony of a reverse shift in literary and 
cultural theory over the past quarter century.  Questions of genius are 
now regarded as hopelessly out of touch with the approaches adopted by 
contemporary cultural theorists and sociologists.  They are denounced as 
naïve, as inherently mystifying and elitist.  Genius is now almost a taboo 
category, and not least because it is seen as epitomising bourgeois 
individualism and masking the collective relations of cultural production 
and consumption.  The critical opposition to ideas of greatness or genius 
is now orthodox.  Popular music studies has fallen into line with this 
orthodoxy.  If you look through the index of any academic book on 
popular music over the past twenty years, you’ll find a broad range of 
issues covered, but it will prove very difficult to locate any discussion of 
genius, at least beyond that of suspicion and critical dismissal.  Search 
through past issues of this journal – the category remains elusive.  Its 
general absence in popular music studies as in cultural studies is because 
it is seen as riddled with reactionary values, with illusion, misconception 
and myth.  To discuss the category of genius with any seriousness is now 
regarded as a highly dubious business.   
 
In a book we have recently completed, we found ourselves 
continually returning to this issue and arriving, towards the end of the 
book, with a strong sense of the need to challenge this orthodoxy (Negus 
and Pickering, 2004).  The book deals with the question of creativity.  In 
pursuing this question across various arts and cultural media, we have 
found that many of the key moments in our discussion have direct 
bearings on our more specialist work in popular music studies.  This is 
especially the case with the category of genius.  In the book as a whole, 
we consider how certain types of creativity are recognised and rewarded 
by the cultural industries, how creative artists operate in relation to 
convention and tradition, and how they have been constrained or 
oppressed by divisions of class, gender and race.  Yet as we moved from 
these considerations, we found ourselves having to confront the fact that 
many singers, songwriters and musicians – as with many painters, 
novelists and dramatists – are esteemed for their creative exceptionality, 
or at least for the exceptionality of some of what they produce.  The 
special character of these cases of creative exceptionality led us on to the 
category of genius, the category that has been abandoned by cultural 
theory.    
 
Having spent most of our academic careers to date working on 
various areas of popular culture, we neither broach the issue of 
exceptionality solely in relation to high culture, nor support a conception 
of high culture constructed in polar opposition to popular culture or the 
popular arts.  We share in and endorse the movement away from 
exclusive conceptions of creative practice towards a more inclusive 
consideration of creativity in its more pervasive forms.  But such 
movement doesn’t mean that we can forget about creative exceptionality, 
not least because exceptionality continues to figure in most people’s 
everyday judgement and appreciation of what they take to be creative. It 
is not only poet laureates who talk of exceptionality, transcendence, 
genius and the like.  To echo, but also to extend a point made by Simon 
Frith in Performing Rites (1996), in practice all sorts of people – 
including cultural theorists, at least when they’re away from the lectern or 
seminar room – operate in some way with an aesthetic value of 
exceptionality, in popular music as much as anywhere else.  In everyday 
conversations about popular music, there is often mention of key 
moments of genre emergence and development, significant shifts of 
musical pattern and possibility, landmark albums, outstanding artists. If 
these judgements about any particular musical genre, tradition or artist 
have always to be given careful critical consideration, does this not apply 
also to more general questions of musical migrations and transgressive 
value? Is it not the case that the general question of exceptionality is 
central to how music is valued, how music changes, and how musical 
history is conceived?  If we refuse to tackle the dilemma of dealing with 
both creative exceptionality and the ordinariness of culture, we may be 
left critically bereft in the face of those instances which produce major 
shifts in the way a musical genre, idiom or style is conceived, leading to a 
radical transformation in the artistic possibilities open to it. We may also 
simply vacate an important critical space and leave the stage open for yet 
another rehearsal of naïve, mystical, elitist or hyper-individualistic 
explanations.  
 
We discuss various examples of what have been accepted as 
instances of creative exceptionality in the book, and not only in relation 
to music and musical history.  The cultural analysis of such instances is 
never easy, and certainly doesn’t benefit from abrupt and simplified 
summary in short pieces like this.  Our point here is a more general one. 
It bears on the way in which cultural analysis today fights shy of the 
question of creative exceptionality.  It is as if it doesn’t exist, or cannot be 
recognised as anything other than an ideological chimera.  This 
considerably reduces the explanatory power of such analysis.  It is of 
course the case that a great deal of creative development within a cultural 
form or practice is gradual, cumulative and closely entwined within the 
broader pattern in which it participates.  Examples of creative 
exceptionality which arise out of and are given immediate significance 
within this pattern may be relatively scarce, and how they become 
publicly recognised is conditioned by a whole range of variable historical 
factors and contingencies.  Whether and to what degree such examples in 
any particular case are innovative is also a complex matter that cannot be 
easily decided, which is one reason we go to considerable lengths in the 
book to distinguish between the different shades of meaning that exist in 
the semantics of newness.  But such cases do occur and cannot be 
ignored. 
 
The problem of the neglect of issues concerning exceptionality or 
genius seems in some ways to have arisen because of a continual elision 
of the activity of creating and judgements about that activity.  There is no 
denying that judgements of genius have often been ideologically loaded, 
carrying various unhelpful assumptions about gender, ethnicity and social 
class that have been and continue to be oppressive. But these judgements 
shouldn’t be simply or entirely run together with the activity and practice 
involved in path-breaking moments of innovation, or in what are taken by 
artists as well as by fans to be exceptional cases of music production or 
performance above and beyond other examples within the same genre or 
tradition.  If we try to keep the activity and judgement distinct, at least for 
analytical purposes, we may begin to avoid associating cases of 
exceptionality with the tendency to view genius only through the lens of 
exclusivity.   
 
The ideological coupling of genius and exclusivity has been 
present in the European tradition of high art since the late eighteenth 
century and the category of genius has contributed to the legitimation of 
various types of social divisions, particularly those associated with issues 
of race, class and gender.  The exclusivist attributions of genius are 
legion, in both obvious and not so obvious ways.  But this raises the 
important question as to whether such attributions render exceptionality 
null and void as aesthetic quality.  Current models of the creative process 
in cultural theory remain either silent or shifty about this sort of question.  
Jason Toynbee’s (2000) radius model of creativity, for example, seems 
entirely appropriate for relatively small shifts sideways within a musical 
genre or form, but cannot handle those moments of creative 
exceptionality, leading to huge steps forwards, which a broad public 
remain happy to refer to by the critically unhappy epithet ‘genius’.  The 
purpose of Toynbee’s model lies in its attempt to demystify exceptional 
forms of creativity in the same way in which Bourdieu sought to 
demystify the Kantian notion of a disinterested aesthetic by always 
placing artistic production within its particular field of interest.  
Toynbee’s model has closely followed the prevailing attention in cultural 
sociology to the structural determinants of social reproduction, in ways 
strongly influenced by Bourdieu.  While this is always a necessary 
attention, its shadow side is a compulsive anxiety about individualism 
and Romanticism, as if cultural theory has to keep up its guard by 
insistently disavowing them.  At the same time they are simply used as 
boo-words that conceal a lack of attention to their legacy in our ideas 
about subjectivity, selfhood and self-expression.  It is then often difficult 
to find where the individual has disappeared to or why the power of 
creative expression goes virtually unacknowledged.  Both are lost to the 
ideological ‘construction’ of selfhood, exceptional or otherwise.  They 
glimmer only faintly amid the mechanics of the ‘radius’ or ‘the field’. 
 
 
So is genius really just an ideological construct, as Tia De Nora 
(1997) argues in her study of the political, economic and social context 
within which Beethoven’s work was recognised and his reputation 
‘constructed’?  Or is this again the consequence of seeing the acts and 
attributions of genius as one and the same, and so irremediably steeped in 
suspect values and interests? In the case of De Nora, the methodological 
strategy is quite explicit: aesthetic value (the sound of Beethoven’s 
music) is fused with, collapsed into and reduced to socio-political value 
(the attribution of various beliefs concerning Beethoven’s greatness and 
the use of these within various discourses of privilege and exclusivity). 
 
The praise and celebration of genius may have served dominant values 
and interests in the past, and may continue to do so, but this doesn’t 
necessarily mean that exceptional or highly innovative creative acts are 
simply equivalent to them. As Peter Kivy has argued in a rare attempt to 
retain a notion of genius in the study of music, to say that genius is nothing 
other than a social and political construct makes it an empty concept – there 
are no geniuses, only the politics of genius. DeNora, following Bourdieu, 
deconstructs genius and the appreciation of genius not by contesting value, 
but by contesting motive, as if musical appreciation is only and entirely a 
matter of self-interest – or in Kivy’s lampooning take on this: ‘Scratch a 
music lover and you will, inevitably, find a status seeker or social climber 
beneath’ (2001: 208).  This reduces all musical aesthetics, including the 
aesthetics of popular music, to acts of bad faith. Yet it is surely crucial to 
distinguish between artistic and cultural production on the one hand, and its 
critical acceptance and celebration on the other.  They cannot simply be 
conflated.  In Beethoven’s case, this is an impoverishment of the historical 
imagination.  It fails to address the question as to why his music endures 
beyond the time and place in which he lived, or how it connects with huge 
numbers of people. Is this only due to a social and political construction of 
belief in his genius which serves elites, and nothing to do with the popular 
appeal of the music?   
 
The category of genius may carry a lot of baggage, but it isn’t 
reducible to that baggage. Thinking critically about genius doesn’t mean 
we shall inevitably succumb to cultural snobbery or hero worship. We 
can be anti-elitist and still recognise and discuss cases of creative 
exceptionality in popular music or any other sphere of cultural production 
and performance.  We can critically engage with the difficulties the 
concept of genius raises for feminist theory while also acknowledging 
female geniuses.  Surely it is in the interests of such theory to do so?  And 
surely it is in everyone’s interests not to see what is valued in creative 
exceptionality flattened out into mere variation and insignificance? 
 
 In our extended engagement with these issues, we argue against an 
absolute conception of genius, of genius as ontology – treating the entire 
person/subject as genius – and move instead towards an understanding of 
genius as involving an interflow of artist and theme that produces 
moments of innovation or instances of exceptional production over time 
that change a cultural tradition through the lasting value and significance 
they come to have.  How such value and significance is assessed is 
always a difficult question – and sometimes such judgements are clouded 
by naïve biological determinism, patriarchalism and racism – but it 
always involves moving beyond existing limits, and achieving 
communicative value in an interaction of play and convention. This 
clearly occurs in relation to a social and historical context without being 
confined to it.  The value of what is communicated is such that it finds a 
resonance as it is re-created, re-lived, re-embedded into different lives by 
others in other contrasting contexts across both space and time.  This is, 
for instance, why Handel’s Messiah can still move and be intensely 
enjoyed by present-day atheists in ways which have nothing immediately 
to do with cultural stratifications, any more indeed than it did when the 
Larks of Dean – Lancashire handloom weavers –  delighted in such music 
in the period of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
(Elbourne, 1980).   
 
It is through such considerations that we argue for a 
reconceptualisation of creativity as at once ordinary and exceptional, 
involving the links people make between an everyday conception of 
creative acts and an apprehension of exceptional creative acts.  Genius 
may often be narrated in terms of exceptional moments of musical insight 
or breakthrough, but these are always firmly embedded in an extended 
process of arduous toil and preparation before a musician is able to 
become at one with their art and synthesise from a range of existing 
cultural elements.  In popular music as in other fields of culture, the 
ordinary is not so much at odds with the exceptional as continually open 
to the possibility of becoming exceptional.  Across the route to such 
possibility are lapses, mistakes, moments of failure and mediocrity, or 
mere repetitions of what is aesthetically commonplace. As the music hall 
performer Dan Leno is reported to have once said: ‘Only mediocrity can 
be trusted to be always at its best. Genius must always have lapses 
proportionate to its triumphs’. Against the idea of genius as natural 
endowment or individualist uniqueness, of genius as a rarefied and reified 
state of being, we need to conceive of creativity as embracing both the 
ordinary and exceptional in terms of their productive tension. From this 
tension, genius may be realised. 
 
In the same edition of the newspaper we referred to at the outset, 
we find in the reviews section Steven Poole referring to J.S. Bach as ‘one 
of those apparently transhistorical, godlike figures (Shakespeare was 
another) whom it seems hard to believe was ever a real human being at 
all’ (Guardian Review, 27 September 2003: 31).  This is not only a 
travesty of Bach’s actual practice in musical composition.  It is also an 
example of the absolute sense of genius we want to move beyond in 
trying to rehabilitate the concept within the broad range of creative 
processes, embracing both the mundane and the marvellous. In proposing 
this, we argue for an approach to creativity as the communication of 
experience and the attainment of communicative value that allows us to 
grasp the dynamic, and often paradoxical – even dialectical – connections 
that link the ordinariness and exceptionality of creativity. 
 
 It is because of this relation that forms of popular music move 
between specifically local contexts of production and recognition to 
broader patterns of reception and assimilation.  This is where song or 
music come to have enduring value, however fraught the critical 
assessments associated with this may be.  Such value is not necessarily 
the imposition of power or privilege even if it may come to bear their 
imprint.  It is also about the movements which bring connections between 
different bodies of experience, which allow some form of sharing – 
although not simply of meaning –  and the value of song and music to be 
continually appreciated as they move across time and space.  To 
understand creative exceptionality in popular music in this way means 
that we cannot separate the exceptional from ordinary social and cultural 
life since such life constitutes the set of circumstances from which it takes 
its bearing.  To see it as separated (as psychological quiddity, mystical 
visitation, moment of divine inspiration, madness or drug-induced 
insight) is to see only monumental greatness, ethereally abstracted from 
its contingent temporal and spatial settings.  Creative exceptionality has 
never been part of our understanding of the ‘popular’ in popular music 
studies.  It is high time this changed, for in neglecting it we’re missing 
some very significant issues in musical analysis and history.  
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